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Abstract
We develop a product-diﬀerentiated model where the product space is a network defined
as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substituability (edges). We also locate
consumers into this network, so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her
“ideal” variety. We show that, even though prices need not to be strategic complements, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the price game among firms. Equilibrium prices are determined by both firms’ sign-alternating Bonacich centralities and the average willingness to
pay across consumers. They both hinge on the network structure of the firm-product space.
We also investigate how local product diﬀerentiation and the spatial discount factor aﬀect the
equilibrium prices. We show that these eﬀects non-trivially depend on the network structure.
In particular, we find that, in a star-shaped network, the firm located in the star node does not
always enjoy higher monopoly power than the peripheral firms.
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Introduction

Economists have followed Lancaster (1966, 1979, 1990) in his description of diﬀerentiated products, where a product is defined as a bundle of  characteristics and is visually represented by a
point in an -dimensional Euclidean space. However, even though Euclidean geometry is intuitive
and familiar, its representation is far from being innocuous. For instance, as argued by neuroeconomists, the brain encodes images of products in neural networks that may have a complex
structure (Camerer et al., 2005; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). The main message of this paper is that
modeling product diﬀerentiation through networks rather than Euclidean spaces has dramatic and
unsuspected consequences for the study of a diﬀerentiated industry.
Our point of departure is that understanding the nature of market competition requires a flexible
tool that maps the fundamental features of the product space into substitutability patterns across
varieties available in the market. The salient feature of our setting is to capture the following two
facets of the demand side: (i) proximity of each variety to a consumer’s ideal variety, and (ii) the
binary relationship of direct substitutability between varieties. This is achieved by modeling the
product space as a network.1 In our setup, there is a link between two varieties/nodes if and only if
they are direct substitutes, while a consumer’s willingness-to-pay decays with the distance between
a specific variety and her ideal variety.
One appealing feature of our approach is that it embodies both love for variety, as in monopolistic competition, and lower willingness-to-pay for more distant varieties, as in spatial competition
à la Hotelling-Lancaster. In the 1980s and early 1990s, a number of attempts (Sattinger, 1984;
Perloﬀ and Salop, 1985; Hart, 1985; Deneckere and Rotschild, 1992) have been made to disclose
connections between these seemingly orthogonal views of the world. Having improved substantially
our understanding of the relationships between various models of imperfect competition, these contributions eventually failed to produce a workable model for studying imperfect competition under
product diﬀerentiation. This is why the various intermediate possibilities remain almost ignored in
the literature, a feature of the modern state of the art that we seek to change.
Our approach suggests a new way of modeling firms’ heterogeneity,2 in which asymmetries
solely stem from the diﬀerent positions of firms in the product-variety network. The structure
of the network begets two eﬀects: (i) the localized competition eﬀect, which means that toughness of competition varies from one location to another, depending on the number of each firm’s
potential competitors, and (ii) the market access eﬀect, i.e. a firm that enjoys locational advantage reaches more consumers. Capturing both these eﬀects allows a departure from Chamberlin’s
“heroic assumption”of symmetry, since firms no longer face identical demand curves. Instead, the
behavior of market demands depends on firms’ positions in the product-variety network. In particular, Chamberlin-type and Hotelling-type product spaces are obtained as special cases, when the
substitutability network is a complete graph or a chain, respectively. We also capture the idea of
considering the space of varieties as a compact metric space (Hart, 1979) in a way that leads to in1
The economics of networks is a growing field. For overviews, see Jackson (2008, 2014), Ioannides (2012), Jackson
and Zenou (2015) and Jackson et al. (2016).
2
with respect to, e.g., Melitz (2003), as well as Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), who put firms with asymmetric
marginal costs into a symmetric consumers’ taste space.
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tuitive and testable predictions while working with a general network structure.3 As a consequence,
our model allows for a rich set of regimes of imperfect competition.4
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, we fully characterize the Nash equilibrium in terms of prices for any possible network. To be concrete, we show that the equilibrium price
of any firm is a function of her sign-alternating Bonacich centrality, which is an alter ego of the
widely used measure of nodes’ significance in socioeconomic networks proposed by Bonacich (1987).
It is based on the premise that the node’s importance is determined by how important its neighbors are. The degree of substitutability between the neighboring varieties serves as the discount
factor for the “importance” of neighbors. The firm’s equilibrium price also reflects the average
willingness-to-pay across consumers, which in turn depends on the structure of the network. Interestingly, what matters for the characterization of the equilibrium outcome is a “signed” modification
of the Bonacich centrality (where the discount factor changes sign with the distance in the network), rather than the standard Bonacich centrality with positive discount factor (Ballester et al.,
2006). This feature of the model implies that prices are neither strategic complements nor strategic
substitutes, except for the special case of a complete network. In other words, “my enemy’s enemy
is my friend”. This result highlights the diﬀerence between our model and the standard Bertrand
competition settings, where prices are typically strategic complements (Vives, 1999). Furthermore,
we find that the (sign-alternating) Bonacich centrality matrix plays a role similar to that of the
Slutsky matrix associated with the demand system generated by the underlying product-variety
network.
Second, we investigate how the degree of substitutability between neighboring varieties aﬀects
the equilibrium prices. We find that, when products are highly diﬀerentiated, a small drop in the
degree of diﬀerentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices. However, the magnitude
of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance decay factor. If, for
example, we consider a star-shaped network, we find that the firm located in the star node needs not
enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This is because the firm located at the star node
has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also competes with all peripheral
firms. Which of the two eﬀects prevails depends on the value of the degree of substitutability across
varieties.
Third, we study how the spatial discount factor, which captures the fact that there is an
“exponential decay” eﬀect with respect to distance, aﬀects the equilibrium prices. In particular,
we show that, when products are highly diﬀerentiated, an increase in the spatial discount factor
leads to higher prices. The intuition behind this result is easy to grasp: when this factor increases,
each firm has less monopoly power over consumers situated in the close neighborhood, but a better
3

Indeed, each network is endowed with the geodesic distance, hence it can be viewed as a compact metric space.
The purpose of Hart (1979) was very diﬀerent from ours: his highly abstract model was aimed at studying the nature
of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition, hence both existence of equilibrium and generating intuitive and testable
predictions about the market outcome were not the focus of his paper.
4
In this paper, our understanding of what a “regime of imperfect competition”means is diﬀerent from that in
d’Aspremont and Dos Santos Ferreira (2009), who develop a unifying approach of oligopolistic competition allowing
for varying competitive toughness. We, instead, focus on Bertrand competition with a diﬀerentiated good, but relax
substantially the standard assumptions on the structure of the product space. As a consequence, our model allows
for versatile behavior of markups and industrial concentration.
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access to the distant consumers. The latter eﬀect dominates the former when varieties are “bad”
substitutes. On the contrary, when varieties are close substitutes, the opposite may occur, for which
we provide examples obtained via simulations.
Fourth, we recast our model in a transportation setting in which the spatial discount factor
is replaced by the transport cost, and show that our results remain qualitatively the same. We
provide such an analysis in order to ease the comparison of our results with the spatial competition
literature, where transportation costs play a major role. In the reformulated model, the key force
that shapes the market outcome is the interaction between two types of firms’ centrality: the (signalternating) Bonacich centrality and the inverse of the closeness centrality, which indicates the
average distance from a specific variety to the others across the network. The closeness centrality
plays the same role in the modified model as the average willingness-to-pay in the baseline model.
We also investigate the case of regular networks (i.e. such that all nodes have the same number
of links) and provide a necessary and suﬃcient condition for a symmetric equilibrium to exist. In
this case, we show that less localized competition (which is formally modeled by adding links in the
network while keeping the number of nodes constant) may lead to either lower or higher equilibrium
price. This is because two opposite eﬀects are at work: the competition eﬀect, which reflects an
increase in toughness of competition when the network gets more connected, and the market access
eﬀect, which is due to the fact that new links bring all consumers closer to each firm. The market
access eﬀect drives prices upwards, while the competition eﬀect leads to a reduction in prices. We
show that a lower bound and an upper bound of the spatial discount factor exist, such that the
competition eﬀect dominates the market access eﬀect if and only if the spatial discount factor is
within the two bounds. Otherwise, the result is reversed.
Finally, we discuss other implications of our model. In particular, we study how the Herfindahl
index varies with the network structure, and show that a denser network does not necessary result
in a higher level of market competitiveness. We also give the empirical implications of our model.
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows. In the next section, we review the related literature and
highlight our contribution. In Section 3, we describe our model and determine the Nash equilibrium.
In particular, we illustrate our results with two extreme cases of competition: the Chamberlinian
competition for which the network is complete and the Chen-Riordan competition for which the
network is star-shaped. We perform the comparative statics exercises of our model in Section 4.
Symmetric equilibria are analyzed in Section 5. The implications of our model are investigated in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.

2

Related literature

In industrial organization, there are two dominating approaches to modeling product diﬀerentiation:
() spatial competition, also known as the address approach, which was first suggested by Hotelling
(1929) and further developed by Lancaster (1966), and () monopolistic competition, introduced
by Chamberlin (1933) and formalized by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).5
Each of these approaches has generated a large flow of contributions, which have been applied to
5

For overviews, see Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), Anderson et al. (1992) and Matsuyama (1995).
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a wide range of economic issues (see, e.g. Helpman and Krugman, 1989; Fujita and Thisse, 2013).
However, both approaches have limitations. On the one hand, spatial competition a la Hotelling
relies on the principle of mutually exclusive choices, meaning that each consumer purchases only
one variety. On the other hand, all varieties are assumed to be equally good substitutes in models
of monopolistic competition and due to consumers’ love for variety, all varieties are consumed in
equal volumes. As a consequence, the two frameworks feature strong dissimilarities in patterns of
consumers’ behavior, which, in turn, imply diﬀerent properties of market outcomes. In this regard,
we struggle to provide a unifying framework for studying imperfect competition in a “firm-product”
space, which would capture both features of Hotelling’s and Chamberlin’s models.
Our model can be viewed as a further development of both monopolistic competition models (Matsuyama, 1995) and the “spokes” model of product diﬀerentiation proposed by Chen and
Riordan (2007), where the network represents the variety space. From the technical viewpoint,
our approach is related to literature on games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2015) where the
network is explicitly modeled as a graph and the payoﬀ functions are linear-quadratic (see, in particular, Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé et al., 2014; Calvó-Armengol et al., 2009). The focus and
results are, however, very diﬀerent to ours. There is also a growing literature that models price
competition between firms with an explicit network. Two important papers in this literature are
that of Bloch and Quérou (2013) and Candogan et al. (2012).6 Bloch and Quérou (2013) study
optimal monopoly pricing in the presence of network externalities across consumers. The setting
proposed by these authors involves a homogeneous good produced by a monopolist, and many consumers whose probability to purchase the good. Candogan et al. (2012) develop a similar approach,
but with a divisible good.7 In contrast to these papers, we account for product diﬀerentiation and
consider a price-setting game among several firms. There is also an interesting literature on more
general aspect of industrial organization and networks. However, most papers in this literature
(Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001; Goyal and Joshi, 2003; Westbrock, 2010; König, 2013; König
et al., 2014) introduce the network through R&D collaborations. We believe we are the first to
apply the toolkit of games on networks to modeling competition in product-variety space within
an address approach.8
To be precise, the main novelty of our modeling strategy compared to the previous literature
may be described as follows. First, the ideal variety of each consumer, or, equivalently, consumer’s
location in a “firm-product” space, is a node in the network. Second, the geodesic distance between
nodes measures the degree of taste heterogeneity. In addition, the degree of pairwise substitutability
between product varieties is high (low) - or, equivalently, firms are (are not) involved into headto-head competition - when there is a link (there is no link) between the corresponding nodes. In
other words, the principal role of a network in our model is that it captures the substitutability
relationship between diﬀerentiated products. This is where our work departs from the modern
“non-spatial”paradigm of modeling imperfect competition in international trade (Ottaviano et al.,
6

See also Shi (2003), Deroian and Gannon (2006), Banerji and Dutta (2009), Billand et al. (2014), Carroni and
Righi (2015), Currarini and Feri (2015) and Chen et al. (2015).
7
See also Bimpikis et al. (2015) who develop a model with a bipartite graph where nodes are either firms or
markets and a link between firm  and market  exists if firm  operates in market .
8
Note that Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) have developed within spatial competition theory a graph-theoretic
setup to determine rigorously the set of firms forming an industry in the spatial economy.
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2002; Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Dhingra, 2013; Mayer et al., 2014), where the
substitution term is the same across varieties and where heterogeneities are mostly on the supply
side.9 The relationship of our work to this strand of literature is best described as follows. Recent
studies of monopolistic competition under variable elasticity of substitution (Behrens and Murata,
2007; Zhelobodko et al., 2012; Parenti et al., 2014) go in the direction of dealing with more and
more general classes of symmetric consumers’ utilities, remaining within the non-spatial paradigm.
We, instead, choose to study the consequences of a non-specified network structure of the product
space. This is done at the cost of working with a relatively specific family of utilities (namely,
linear-quadratic), which are well known to be best suited for studying games on networks.
Finally, our paper echoes the logit model of product diﬀerentiation (Anderson et al., 1992;
Anderson et al., 1995), in which combining the ideal variety approach and the love for variety
approach is achieved by introducing a probabilistic choice on the consumers’ side. Furthermore,
our comparative statics results, while being generically diﬀerent from those obtained within the
standard spatial competition approach a la Hotelling (see Section 4.2), parallel recent findings by
Chen and Riordan (2008) on price-increasing competition. We diﬀer from all these authors by
stressing the role of the topology of the product space, which we model by means of a network.

3
3.1

The model
Notations and definitions

There are  firms that produce  diﬀerent varieties, each firm  = 1   producing one variety .
Each firm/variety is embedded into a network (N  G), where each variety  ∈ N ≡ {1 2   } is a
node, while G = ( )=1 is the adjacency matrix that keeps track of the degree of substitutability
between the neighboring varieties in the network. To be more precise, there is a link (i.e.  = 1)
between varieties  and  if and only if these two varieties are direct substitutes. Otherwise, a link
does not exist, i.e.  = 0. By convention,  = 0. Quite naturally,  =  so that the network
is undirected, which implies that G is a square (0 1) symmetric matrix with zeros on its diagonal.
We have the following standard network-related definitions. A walk in a network (N  G) refers
to a sequence of nodes, 1  2  3      −1   such that  +1 = 1 for each  from 1 to  − 1. The
length of the walk is the number  − 1 of links in it. A path in a network (N  G) is a walk in
(N  G), 1  2  3      −1   , such that all the nodes are distinct. The (geodesic) distance 
between two nodes  and  in a network is the length of a shortest path between them. The th
 G of the adjacency matrix G keeps track of indirect connections in G.
power G = G × ( )
[]
More precisely, the coeﬃcient  in the ( ) cell of G gives the number of walks of length  in G
9
In the modern trade literature, network perspective is typically used for studying free-trade agreements (see,
e.g., Furusawa and Konishi, 2007). A notable exception is Behrens et al. (2007), who consider trading countries as
nodes of a spatial network and stress the role of Bonacich centrality for understanding the equilibrium trade patterns.
Note also that Osharin et al. (2014) and Tarasov (2014) study income-taste heterogeneities across consumers within
non-spatial settings. Their approaches, however, are substantially diﬀerent from ours, for the demand side in their
model is described by the standard CES utility, hence, any two varieties are equally substitutable. A setting closer
to ours is used by Di Comite et al. (2014), who work with asymmetric linear-quadratic preferences to study the
empirical implications of country-specific taste mismatch patterns on trade flows.
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between  and . The set of neighbors (here direct substitutes) of node (here variety)  in network
(N  G) are denoted by N = {all | = 1}.
In our model, the distance between two products in the network measures the degree of substitutability between these two products so that the higher is the distance, the poorer substitutes
are these products. In other words, the network (N  G) plays the role of a “firm-product” space
in the model and captures the degree of substitution between  varieties supplied in the economy.
Because we do not impose any specific assumptions about the network structure, we find that our
approach is flexible enough to encompass diﬀerent types of spatial structures, commonly studied
in the industrial-organization literature. Figure 1 illustrates some of these networks. For example,
Chamberlinian competition (due to Chamberlin, 1933) corresponds to the complete network (Figure 1a), Hotelling competition (due to Hotelling, 1929) to the line or chain network (Figure 1b),
Salop competition (due to Salop, 1979) to the circle network (Figure 1c) and the Chen-Riordan
competition (due to Chen and Riordan, 2007) to the star network (Figure 1d).
[   1 ]
As stressed in the Introduction, the two features of this setup have major advantages: it naturally brings together love for variety and spatial taste heterogeneity, while giving access to a rich
array of research techniques developed recently in games on networks. An obvious critique to our
approach is that the product space underlying our model is essentially discrete, while monopolistic
competition models (starting with Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) typically involve a continuum of varieties. We believe that this seemingly major discrepancy does not raise, in fact, any conceptual
diﬃculty. Following the same lines as in Hart (1979), it is fairly straightforward to develop a “continuous” counterpart of our setting, in which the product-variety space could be represented by,
say, a Riemannian manifold (or a more general compact metric space). We choose, however, to
work instead with networks, for two reasons. First, we believe that they are more intuitive objects
for most economists. Second, we find it more natural to build on the toolkit of games on networks
rather than to develop from scratch conceptually similar techniques for general compact metric
spaces.

3.2

Consumers

We have seen that a network is composed of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substitutability (edges). In the network, we can also locate consumers so that the location of each
consumer  = 1   corresponds to her “ideal” variety. As a result, there are as many consumers
as varieties.
3.2.1

Preferences

A consumer located at location/node  ∈ N , i.e. whose ideal variety is , has the following
linear-quadratic utility function:
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 ( G) = 0 +

X

∈N

  −

⎛

1⎝
2

X

∈N

2 +

X

∈N

⎞

    ⎠

(1)

where 0 is the level of consumption of an outside good,  is the volume of consumer s purchases
of variety produced by firm  (i.e. located at node ) whereas  is the consumer-specific willingness
to pay for variety .
We believe that assuming linear-quadratic preferences is quite natural for at least two reasons.
First, ever since Singh and Vives (1984), it has been a workhorse model in diﬀerentiated oligopoly
theory (see Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, Ch. 3). Second, at least since Ottaviano et al. (2002),
symmetric linear-quadratic preferences are among the best-established functional specifications for
preferences in both trade literature (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) and urban economics literature
(Picard and Tabuchi, 2013). We diﬀer from these authors in at least two respects. First, we work
with preferences that are both asymmetric across varieties, like in Foster et al. (2008) or Picard
and Okubo (2012), and heterogeneous across consumers, like in Di Comite et al. (2014). Second,
we assume the parameters  and   dependent on the product-variety network structure. More
precisely, we assume that  is a decreasing function of the (geodesic) distance  in the network
between variety  and the ideal variety of consumer . Indeed, as in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
we assume that
(2)
 =  
where 0    1 is a spatial discount factor. This captures the fact that there is an “exponential
P
decay” of the attractiveness of varieties with distance. Observe that the term ∈N   captures
the proximity of other varieties to the ideal variety of consumer  and depends on the location of
 in the network (i.e. her ideal product). It is referred to as the proximity network eﬀect.
Furthermore, the coeﬃcients   depend on the structure of the network (N  G) as well. More
specifically, we assume that   ≡  (where   0 is a positive substitution parameter) so
that only direct substitutes for which  = 1 have an impact on the utility function. In other
words,  captures the global substitution eﬀect while  accounts for local substitution eﬀect.
Observe that   is network specific but not consumer specific. A higher  means that varieties are
less diﬀerentiated and³thus the consumption of close´ substitutes reduces the utility of consuming
P
P
2
variety . The term 12
∈N  +
∈N     accounts for the consumer’s love for variety
but does not depend on her position on the network. This is referred to as the love-for-variety
eﬀect.
At this stage, we find useful to compare our setting to the standard approaches to product
diﬀerentiation (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010, Chap. 5). On the one hand, in love-for-variety models
of market competition (monopolistic competition) with linear-quadratic utility,  serves as the sole
(inverse) measure of product diﬀerentiation while  is not individual-specific. On the other hand,
in spatial competition models, the transportation cost is a measure of product diﬀerentiation. Our
setting diﬀers from both these frameworks in at least two respects. First, instead of , we have
here  , defined by (2), which depends on the location of the consumer  in the network, while the
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spatial discount factor  is a counterpart of the shopping cost in models a la Hotelling.10 Second,
instead of , we have here   ≡  , which depends on the structure of the network. To sum up,
we have an essentially multidimensional description of how diﬀerentiated varieties are, given by ,
, and the network G. Indeed,  keeps track of the degree to which a consumer’s valuation of the
ideal variety exceeds that of any other variety,  measures the degree of love for variety and G
captures the topology of the product space, which aﬀects the interplay between  and .
To illustrate the nature of the terms  and  in the utility function (1), consider the star network
of Figure 1d (Chen-Riordan competition with  = 4). In that case, for the consumer whose ideal
variety is the star (node  = 1), the proximity eﬀect amounts to
=4
X

1 1 = 11 + 

=1

=4
X

1 

=2

while the love-for-variety eﬀect is given by
=4=4
X

=4=4
X

  1 1 = 

=1=16=

 1 1 = 11 (21 + 31 + 41 ) 

=1=16=

For any peripheral agent, for example the one whose ideal variety is  = 2, we have:
=4
X

2 2 = 22 + 12 + 2

=1

and

=4=4
X

2

=3

  2 2 = 

=1=16=

=4
X

=4=4
X

 2 2 = 12 (22 + 32 + 42 )

=1=16=

Observe that the substitution eﬀect is global and network specific, while the willingness-to-pay
eﬀect is consumer specific.
For the Salop-type product space, the network is regular of order 2, which means that each
variety has two direct substitutes. In that case, for example, for the consumer whose ideal variety
is  = 1, we have:
4
X
1 1 = 11 +  (21 + 41 ) + 2 31
=1

and

=4=4
X

=1=16=

  1 1 = 

=4=4
X

 1 1 =  (11 21 + 11 41 + 21 31 + 31 41 )

=1=16=

Let us compare these two terms for these two diﬀerent networks. Consider first the proximity
10
In Section 4.2.3, we explicitly reformulate our model in terms of transportation cost instead of spatial discount
factor to investigate if the properties of the model remain the same under the two formulations.
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network eﬀect. In the star network, all varieties are relatively close to each other so consumers do
not lose too much from consuming other varieties than their ideal one while, the reverse occurs for
the Salop competition (circle network) where some variety can be as far as 2 edges away and, in
the case of  varieties, one can be as far as 2 edges away. As a result, consuming more varieties
diﬀerent from the ideal variety has a higher impact on the proximity term of utility in the star
network than in the circle network. If we now consider the love-for-variety eﬀect, then we have the
opposite. Indeed, the Chen-Riordan competition implies that many varieties (the ones located at
the periphery of the network) are not direct substitutes (because they have a good match with local
consumers’ tastes, while consumers’ tastes are very heterogeneous across locations) and compete
with only one variety (the one located in the center of the network), which is a direct substitute for
any “local” variety. On the contrary, in the circular model, each variety competes only with its two
nearest neighbors. Therefore, consumers obtain more utility in terms of the love-for-variety eﬀect
in the circle network than in the star network. As a result, there is a trade oﬀ between diﬀerent
networks (or competition regimes) that we want to study in equilibrium.
Observe that when  = 1, then no consumer has ideal variety. If, in addition, the network is
complete (Chamberlin network, Figure 1a), we are back to the standard representative consumer’s
approach, where only the love for-variety eﬀect matters, while the proximity network eﬀect does
not.
3.2.2

Individual demand

For the sake of the exposition, we rewrite the utility function (1) in vector-matrix form:
1
(3)
 ( G) = 0 + α ( G) x − x (I + G)x 
2
where α ( G) = ( )=1 and x ≡ ( )=1 are  × 1 vectors, I is the identity matrix
of order  and x is the transpose of vector x. Denote by 1 (G)      (G), the eigenvalues of
G where, without loss of generality, 1 (G) ≥ 2 (G) ≥    ≥  (G), so that 1 (G) is the largest
eigenvalue of G while  (G) is the lowest eigenvalue of G.
Lemma 1 The utility function (3) is strictly concave in x if and only if:
−

1
 (G)

(4)

Consumer  seeks to maximize her utility (3) with respect to (0  x) subject to the budget
constraint:
0 + p x =  
where  is consumer ’s income whereas p = ( )∈N is the price vector. Plugging the value of 0
from this budget constraint into (3) yields:
1
 ( G) =  − p x + α ( G) x − x (I + G)x
2
10

The inverse demand of consumer  for variety  ∈ N is given by:
 =  ( G) −  − 

X

    = 1     

(5)

6=

or, in vector-matrix form,
p = α ( G) − (I + G)x 

(6)

By solving (6) for x , we obtain consumer ’s individual demands for all varieties:
x∗ = B (− G) [α ( G) − p] 

(7)

where B (− G) ≡ (I + G)−1 . Note that (4) implies that B is well-defined. Moreover, if


1
1 (G)

(8)

then B can be expanded in a power series as follows:11
B (− G) = I − G +  2 G2 −  3 G3 +   

(9)

Following Bonacich (1987) and using (9), we may define the vector of sign-alternating Bonacich
centrality measures of varieties as:
b (− G u) ≡ B (− G) u

(10)

P
 []
where u is any  ×1 vector. In the coordinate form, we have:  = ∞
=0 (−)  , or equivalently
(
[2]
[3]
1 +  2  −  3  + 
for  = 
 =
(11)
[2]
[3]
2
3
− +   −   +  for  6= 
[]

Observe that  is the number of walks of length  in the network, which starts at variety  and
[2]

ends at variety  (see Section 3.1). In particular,  is just the number of neighbors (i.e. direct
[3]
substitutes) of variety  while  is the number of triangles involving , i.e. the number of couples
of direct substitutes which are also good substitutes for each other. As can be seen from (11), 
can be viewed as a firm-specific measure for toughness of competition faced by a firm producing
variety . When firm ’s closest competitors also compete with each other, this relaxes the burden
[3]
of competition borne by firm . That is why  enters (11) with the negative coeﬃcient (−)3 .
The cycles of higher orders are also accounted for, but their weight decays exponentially with .
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For example, under Hotelling competition (Figure 1b) with  varieties, we have  distinct eigenvalues and the
largest eigenvalue 1 (G) of this matrix is less than 2 (but converges to 2 when  → ∞). Moreover, if  is an
eigenvalue of G, then − is also an eigenvalue of G. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for (4) and (8) to hold is:  ≤ 12.
Under Salop competition (Figure 1c) with  varieties, the largest eigenvalue 1 (G) of this matrix is equal to 2.
Hence, (4) and (8) boil down to   12.
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The intuition behind the matrix B (− G) and the centrality measure (10) in our context can
be further clarified using the demand system (7). Indeed, B (− G) is the Slutsky matrix of the
consumers’ demand, while the corresponding vector of centrality measures can serve to directly
compute the responses of quantities purchased to changes in prices. More precisely, consider a
vector dp of changes in prices. Then, a vector of corresponding changes in the quantities purchased
by each consumer  will be given by:
dx∗ = −B (− G) dp = −b (− G dp) 

(12)

To sum up, a variety that has a higher (lower) centrality in the product-variety network means
that the demand for this variety is more (less) sensitive to changes in prices.
Applying (11) to (12) yields the following decomposition of price eﬀects:
d∗ = −d + 

X

∈N

 d −  2

X

[2]

 d +  3

∈N

X

[3]

 d +   

(13)

∈N

Equation (13) describes the response of the consumption level of variety  to price changes dp
in a fairly intuitive way. The immediate (and myopic) response of consumer , captured by the first
term in the right-hand side of (13), is just to reduce consumption of variety  by d , without paying
any attention to changes in prices for other varieties. This is not the end of the story, however.
Individual  realizes that the initial decision has been fairly myopic, and seeks to adjust better her
consumption bundle to the new circumstances. She does so by accounting for changes in prices of
P
the closest substitutes of variety , the resulting change in ∗ being captured by  ∈N  d ,
the second term in the right-hand side of (13). Quite naturally, this term is positive (negative) if
prices for varieties neighboring to  have increased (decreased). However, our individual refines even
better her decision by taking into account also the prices for the substitutes of the substitutes. In
other words, she now looks at varieties whose geodesic distance from  is at most 2. The magnitude
P
[2]
of the corresponding change in ∗ is shown by the third term, − 2 ∈N  d . Observe that,
P
P
[2]
unlike the second-order price eﬀect  ∈N  d , the third-order price eﬀect − 2 ∈N  d
[2]

diﬀers from zero even when d = 0 for all  6= , for  =  6= 0, the degree of node . Thus,
the decision-making process described above involves several steps even when prices for all varieties
except  remain unchanged, the reason being that the substitution eﬀect raised by the price shocks
d propagates through the whole network and impacts consumption levels of other varieties, which,
in turn, leads to a feedback eﬀect on the choice of how much of variety  to purchase. To sum up,
(13) illustrates the “iterative” nature of consumers’ responses to price shocks.
Observe also that, in the literature on games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2015), the
(weighted) Bonacich centrality is usually defined as B ( G) u where
B ( G) = I + G +  2 G2 +  3 G3 +   

(14)

so that there are no negative terms. Here, we have a diﬀerent definition that allows for negative
values of the decay factor, which in fact, is also considered in the original article of Bonacich (1987),
who discusses the interpretation of his centrality measure when the decay factor is alternate signs.
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In our case, this means that even powers of G are weighted positively and odd powers negatively.
This implies that having many direct ties (degree) contributes negatively to centrality, but, if
one’s connections themselves have many connections, so that there are many paths of length two,
centrality is augmented.
To gain more intuition about the nature of individual demands, we can write (7) as follows:
∗ =

X

∈N

  ( G) −   −

X

 

(15)

∈N 6=

The individual demand (15)X
of consumer  for variety  is made of three terms. First, the intercept
  ( G), shows the maximum demand for this variety when
of the individual demand,
∈N

prices are equal to zero. It is, in fact, the weighted sign-alternating Bonacich centrality of variety 
for consumer , where the weights are the exponential decay factors  :
⎡
⎤
X
X
X
  ( G) =  ⎣ + 
 + 2
 + ⎦
∈N

∈N1 ()

∈N2 ()

where N () is the set of nodes (varieties) such that the geodesic distance between  and  equals
, where  ∈ N (). This means that, if a consumer is very “central”, i.e. she is close to all varieties
in the network (like the star in the Chen-Riordan competition network in Figure 1d), then this
consumer’s willingness to pay is very high. Observe that the intercept of the individual demand is
the only part of the demand function which is individual specific and depends of the consumer ’s
position in the network.
Second, the own price eﬀect   captures the eﬀect of price of variety  on its own demand.
The marginal impact of the price  on demand ∗ is equal to  , which is, by (11), the discounted
number of cycles
X involving . Thus,  is network specific, but not individual specific. Finally, the
  comprises the cross-price eﬀects and has a similar interpretation as   .
last term
∈N 6=

This means that the price eﬀect crucially depends on the structure of the network. For instance,
a complete network will generate price eﬀects very diﬀerent from those in a star network. Let us
now illustrate these diﬀerences.

Examples Consider the Chamberlin-type spatial structure (Figure 1a) with  varieties. In
this case, G has only two distinct eigenvalues, 1 =  − 1 2 = 3 =  =  = −1. Hence, (4)
and (8) boil down to   1( − 1). Consider the case of  = 4. Then, if   13, we have:
B (− G) ≡ (I + G)−1 =

⎛

⎜
1
⎜
⎜
(1 + 2 − 3 2 ) ⎝
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1 + 2
−
−
−
−
1 + 2
−
−
−
−
1 + 2
−
−
−
−
1 + 2

⎞

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

(16)

and
 ( G) =

(

 if  = 
 if  6= 

As a result, the individual demand (say for individual 1) for all four varieties is given by:

x∗1 =

⎛

⎜
1
⎜
⎜
(1 + 2 − 3 2 ) ⎝

 (1 + 2 − 3) − (1 + 2) 1 +  (2 + 3 + 4 )
 ( − ) − (1 + 2) 2 +  (1 + 3 + 4 )
 ( − ) − (1 + 2) 3 +  (1 + 2 + 4 )
 ( − ) − (1 + 2) 4 +  (1 + 2 + 3 )

⎞

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

(17)

As implied by (17), when  → 1, the demand system becomes completely symmetric. On the
contrary, under Chen-Riordan spatial structure (Figure 1d) with  varieties, the eigenvalues of are:
√
√
1 =  − 1 2 =    = −1 = 0  = −  − 1. Hence, a necessary and suﬃcient condition
√
√
for (4) and (8) to hold is   1  − 1. For  = 4 and   1 3, we have (1 is the star variety):
⎛

and

⎜
1
⎜
B (− G) =
⎜
2
(1 − 3 ) ⎝

1
−
−
−
2
2
− 1 − 2

2
−
2
1 − 2 2
2
2
2
−


1 − 2 2

1 ( G) =
while for  6= 1,

(

⎞

⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

(18)

 if  = 1
 if  6= 1

⎧
⎪
if  = 
⎨ 
 ( G) =

if  = 1
⎪
⎩ 2 otherwise.

As a result, the individual demand for individual 1 (whose ideal variety is the star variety) for all
four varieties is given by:
⎛
⎞
 (1 − 3) − 1 +  (2 + 3 + 4 )
⎜  ( − ) − ¡1 − 2 2 ¢  +  −  2 ( +  ) ⎟
1
⎜
1
3
4 ⎟
∗
¡
¢ 2
x1 =
⎜
⎟
2
2
2
(1 − 3 ) ⎝  ( − ) − 1 − 2 3 + 1 −  (2 + 4 ) ⎠
¢
¡
 ( − ) − 1 − 2 2 4 + 1 −  2 (2 + 3 )

The individual demand for all four varieties of a peripheral consumer, say individual 2, whose ideal
variety is variety 2, is given by:
⎛
⎞
¡
¢
  − 22 −  − 1 +  (2 + 3 + 4 )
¢
¢
¡
¡
⎜  1 + 2 2 2 − 2 2 −  − 1 − 2 2  +  −  2 ( +  ) ⎟
1
⎜ ¡
1
3
4 ⎟
¢ ¡
¢ 2
x∗2 =
⎜
⎟
(1 − 3 2 ) ⎝   2 −  2 2 + 2 −  − 1 − 2 2 3 + 1 −  2 (2 + 4 ) ⎠
¢
¢ ¡
¡
  2 −  2 2 + 2 −  − 1 − 2 2 4 + 1 −  2 (2 + 3 )
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Two comments are in order. First, as stated above, the network-specific eﬀect on the individual
demand, that is the price eﬀect, is the same for all consumers (star and peripheral) in the network
as can be seen by the terms after the intercept. We see that () own price eﬀect, ∗  , is always
negative for the demand of each consumer and for each variety, () the cross-price eﬀects, ∗  ,
 6= , are positive (negative) if and only if either  or  is the star (both  and  are peripheral
varieties). In other words, any peripheral variety is a gross substitute for the star (central) variety
(positive eﬀect) while peripheral varieties come to be gross complements to each other (negative
eﬀect). This is very diﬀerent from what we find in the Chamberlinian type of product space (see
(17)) where all varieties are direct substitutes to each other: ∗  =   0,  6= .
Second, consider the intercept in the demand function, which is individual specific and depends
on the position in the network. We can see that, for the star variety, which is at distance 1 to every
other variety, the consumer’s demand is much higher than for any peripheral variety. This does
not imply, however, that the “star” firm  = 1 will always enjoy more monopoly power than any
peripheral firm. We will consider this issue in more detail in Section 4.
3.2.3

Aggregate demand

We now turn to deriving
Xthe aggregate demand for variety . Using (7), it is straightforward to see
∗
x∗ of aggregate demands faced by firms is given by:
that the vector X ≡
∈N

X∗ = B (− G)

"

X

∈N

#

(α ( G) − p) 

(19)

Define the vector of average willingness to pay across consumers as
α ( G) ≡

1 X
α ( G) 

∈N

Since  =  , we have:
i
 h
(20)
1 + 1 () + 2 2 () +    +   () 

where  ≡ max∈N  is the diameter of the network while  () is the number of nodes (varieties)
whose geodesic distance from node  equals . In particular, 1 () is the degree of node . Using
(20) and (19), we can write aggregate demand for variety  as follows:
⎞
⎛
X
X
  −   −
  ⎠ 
∗ =  ⎝
(21)
 ( G) =

∈N

6=

where  are the elements of B ≡ B (− G) (see (11)).
In order to guarantee that expressions (21) make economic sense, we have to require that the
choke-oﬀ price of aggregate demand for each variety is positive. In other words, the following
inequalities must hold:
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X

∈N

   0 for all  ∈ N 

(22)

Observe that (22) always holds when  is not too large, i.e. when products are enough diﬀerentiated. Indeed, as implied by (11), we have:
(
1 for  = 
(23)
lim  =
→0
0 for  6= 
A suﬃcient condition for (22) to hold is that B is a strictly diagonally dominant matrix with
weights ̄ :
  

X
6=

| |

for all  ∈ N 

(24)

As implied by (23), there exists a positive threshold value ( G) of , such that (24) holds for
all   ( G).

3.3

Firms

Each firm  ∈ N faces the aggregate demand (21) for its variety, and seeks to maximize its profit
given by   ≡   . Using (21), this yields:12
⎛
⎞
X
X
(25)
  =   ⎝
  −   −
  ⎠ 
∈N

6=

where  are the elements of B (see (11)). Firm  chooses  that maximizes (25). The first-order
conditions are given by
2  +

X

  =

X

  

(26)

∈N

6=

where  ∈ N .
Since   is strictly concave in  , the second-order conditions hold automatically, given that the
first-order condition holds.
Solving (26) for  , we obtain the best-reply function of firm :
⎛
⎞
X 
1
( −  )⎠ 
∗ (p−  G) = ⎝ +
(27)
2

6=

In terms of the primitives of the model, (27) can be written as follows:
12

For simplicity, we impose the standard assumption that there is no cost of production. Assuming a constant
marginal cost   0 will not change any of our results.

16

 =  −

X

Γ  

(28)

6=

where

 ≡
2
and

P

=0

P

∈N

P∞

P∞


=0 

[]

(−)   ()

 []
=0 (−) 

P∞
 []
1 =0 (−) 

Γ = P∞
[]
2
(−) 
=0

(29)

(30)



An interesting result here is that, except when the network is of Chamberlinian type, the price
game does not always exhibit strategic complements. This is to be contrasted with the literature
on non-spatial Bertrand competition, where most games display strategic complementarities (see
Vives, 1999). Indeed, it is easily verified that
1 
∗ (p−  G)
=−


2 

(31)

Observe that, when (8) holds, we have   0. However, this is not necessarily true for  .13 More
precisely, as implied by (11),   0 if and only if the geodesic distance between  and  is even
while the opposite is true when geodesic distance between  and  is odd. In particular, if  = 1,
i.e. goods  and  are close substitutes ( = 1), then   0 and therefore prices  and  are
[2]
strategic complements. If  = 0 and  = 1, i.e. goods  and  are less close substitutes (distance
2), then   0 and therefore prices  and  are strategic substitutes.
To understand the intuition of this result, consider again the Chen-Riordan network (Figure
1d) with three firms. In that case,  is negative if and only if either  or  is the star (node 1)
while  is positive if and only if both  and  are peripheral nodes. As a result, prices set by
firms 1 and 2 are strategic complements, while prices set by firms 2 and 3 are strategic substitutes.
Indeed, if firm 2 reduces its price, then firm 1 will set a lower price in response. This is because
varieties 1 and 2 are close substitutes, which makes competition between the corresponding firms
very tough. If, now, firm 3 reduces its price and 1 does not react, this positive demand shock for
firm 3 translates into a positive demand shock for firm 2. This is because consumers love variety,
so they choose to purchase larger amounts of good 2, since it is highly diﬀerentiated from good 3.
As a consequence, the best reply of firm 2 to a reduction in 3 is to increase its price.
More generally, for  firms, our price-competition game with networks exhibits neither strategic
complements nor strategic substitutes. To sum up, equation (31) entails that the proverb “an enemy
of my enemy is my friend”applies to our setting. This echoes the paper by Arie et al. (2015) who
13

Observe that under Chamberlinian type of network (Figure 1a), the network is complete so that all firms are in
direct competition with each other and we are back to the standard case with no network. In that case, if the direct
competitors of firm  decrease their prices, they will attract more consumers and thus ’s best-reply is to also decrease
her price. As a result, prices are strategic complements.
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show that, if two small firms serve two separate markets and a large firm serves both these markets,
then, under Bertrand competition, a merger is profitable for each of the small firms.
Another implication of (31) is that  may be viewed as a measure of strategic complementarities
between prices for close substitutes. Indeed, when  = 1, i.e. when products  and  are neighbors
in the substitutability network, then, as implied by (11), (31) boils down to
¡ ¢
∗ (p−  G)

= + O 2 

2

Hence,  gives a first-order approximation of ∗  when firms  and  produce close varieties,
while overall product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high. Based on that, we refer to  as the toughness
of local competition.

3.4

Equilibrium

An equilibrium price vector p∗ is a non-negative solution of (26), or, equivalently, a fixed point of
the best-reply mapping given by (27).
The following proposition shows that a unique equilibrium exists when the degree of product
diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 2 Assume that the value of  is not too high, so that both (8) and (24) are satisfied.
Then, there exists a unique interior Nash equilibrium (p∗  X∗ ) where p∗ is given by

with

and

and where X∗ is given by (21).

³
´−1
e
e ( G) 
α
p∗ = I +  G

e  ( G) ≡
e ≡

 ( G)

1 + 


 
1 + 

(32)

(33)

(34)

As implied by (32), the equilibrium price vector is proportional to something which has a flavor
of a centrality measure from the Bonacich family. Hence, our results bear some resemblance with
those obtained by Ballester et al. (2006). However, this resemblance is rather formal. There are at
least two major diﬀerences. First, in our model the equilibrium price vector (32) is no longer proportional to the standard Bonacich centrality, but rather to the sign-alternating Bonacich centrality
(9). This is because here we are modeling competition (rather than “positive” spillovers, such as
communication externalities or the like) by means of networks. Second, the network generating the
e instead of G. Clearly, G
e describes a weighted
Bonacich centralities in equilibrium depends on G
directed network constructed on the basis of the original network G, the weight e of the -th
substitutability link being defined by (34). The intuition behind this “weighting” procedure is easy
to grasp: while  indicates direct substitutability between  and , the factor  (1 +  ) captures
the relative appeal of variety  compared to , which depends on the positions of varieties  and
18

e is generically not symmetric, which
 in the network. It is also worth noting that the matrix G
captures the fact that the relative position of variety  in the network compared to  may be not
the same as that of  compared to .
To better understand these results, let us calculate the equilibrium for the two extreme cases
of competition: Chamberlinian competition (complete network in Figure 1a) and Chen-Riordan
competition (star network in Figure 1d).
Chamberlinian competition Consider the complete network in Figure 1a with  = 4
varieties. If   13, then the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium is given by:
∗1 = ∗2 = ∗3 = ∗4 =

 (1 − ) (3 + 4)
4 ( + 2)

1∗ = 2∗ = 3∗ = 4∗ =

 (2 + 1) (3 + 4)
3 2 + 7 + 2

Chen-Riordan competition Consider the complete network in Figure 1d with  = 4 vari√
eties. If   1 3, then the unique Nash equilibrium is:
⎛

and
⎛
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝

⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
1∗
2∗
3∗
4∗

∗1
∗2
∗3
∗4
⎞

⎞

⎛

⎜
⎟

⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟=
⎠ 4 (4 − 7 2 ) ⎝

¡
¢
2 + 6 − 3 − 5 2 + 6 3 − 3 1 + 5 − 4 − 2 2 + 2
2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)
2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)
2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)
⎛

⎜
⎟

⎜
⎟
⎜
⎟=
2
4
⎠ (4 − 19 + 21 ) ⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

¡
¢
2 + 6 − 3 − 5 2 + 6 3 − 3 1 − 4 2  − 2 2 + 5 + 2
¤
¡
¢£
1 − 2 2 2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)
¡
¢
£
¤
1 − 2 2 2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)
¤
¢£
¡
1 − 2 2 2 + 2 −  + 42 − 3 2 − 3 (1 +  + 2)

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠

It can easily be verified that, when  is not too large, the price and the aggregate demand of
the star (central) variety is higher than that of the others.

4

Comparative statics

Let us now examine how the diﬀerent parameters of the model aﬀect the equilibrium prices. We
will consider the eﬀect of , the degree of product diﬀerentiation and , the spatial discount factor,
on equilibrium prices.

4.1

A change in the degree of toughness of local competition 

In general, how prices p∗ and aggregate demand X∗ vary with , which is the inverse measure of
product diﬀerentiation, looks pretty complicated and is general ambiguous. However, it turns out
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that it is possible to obtain sharp results for the case when products are highly diﬀerentiated, i.e.
when  is not too large.
4.1.1

Analytical results when  is not too large

Plugging p = p∗ into the first-order conditions (26) and implicitly diﬀerentiating these conditions
with respect to  yields
2

X 
∗ X  ∗ X ∗
 ∗
 + 2  +
 +
=

 





6=

(35)

∈N

6=

When  = 0, it follows from (26) and (11) that ∗ =  2,  = 1 and  = 0 for  6= .
Furthermore, (11) implies that  |=0 = − . Thus, for  = 0, (35) amounts to:
¯
∗ ¯¯
1X
1 X
=
−


=
−
  0
(36)


 ¯=0
4
4
∈N

∈N ()

Assume now that varieties are highly diﬀerentiated, i.e.  is positive but not too far from zero.
∗
Then, applying the continuity argument and using (36), we conclude that   0. Thus, we have
the following result.
Proposition 3 For suﬃciently low values of , we have p∗   0, i.e. an increase in toughness
of local competition  leads to lower prices.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows: when products are highly locally diﬀerentiated,
a small reduction in the degree of diﬀerentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices.
However, the magnitude of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance
decay factor. To illustrate this, consider relative rather than absolute changes in prices in response
to an increase in , we get
¯
1 X 
 ln ∗ ¯¯
=−

¯
 =0
2

∈N ()

When consumers do not treat a specific variety as their “ideal” one (i.e. when  = 1), (36) boils
down to
¯
¯
 ln ∗ ¯¯

1
∗ ¯¯
(37)
= −  ()
= −  ()
¯
¯
 =0
4
 =0
2

where  () is the degree of vertex . Thus, in the special case of  = 1 both absolute and relative
reductions in firm’s price triggered by higher substitutability of varieties are proportional to the
number of the firm’s closest competitors.
Considering another extreme case,  = 0 (when each consumer focuses entirely on consuming
one variety, like in the Hotelling model), we get
¯
¯
 ln ∗ ¯¯
  ()
1
∗ ¯¯

(38)
=−
= −  ()
¯
¯
 =0
4 
 =0
2
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Comparing (37) with (38) yields an unexpected result: percentage
¯ change in price triggered by
 ln ∗ ¯
in general depends on , it
an increase in  is the same when  = 1 as under  = 0. Since  ¯
=0

must be that the relationship between these two magnitudes is non-monotone. Thus, the interplay
between diﬀerent types of product diﬀerentiation is highly non-trivial.
To illustrate, assume the Chen-Riordan competition (Figure 1d), where the product-variety
network is a star. Let  = 1 be the central node. Then, we have
¯
 ln ∗1 ¯¯
 ¯

=0

=−

 − 1 1 +  + ( − 2)2

2
1 + ( − 1)

which is U-shaped in  for any  ≥ 4.
4.1.2

Numerical simulations

Let us now understand how  aﬀects equilibrium prices for larger values of . Because we cannot
solve analytically this comparative statics analysis, we will resort to numerical simulations.
To illustrate how the equilibrium prices vary with , consider a star-shaped network (ChenRiordan competition) with  = 6. Does the firm located in the star node always enjoy higher
monopoly power than the other firms? The answer is no. The firm located at the star node has
better access to the market than the periphery firms, but it also faces tougher competition (five
direct competitors instead of one). Which of the two eﬀects prevails depends on the value of the
substitutability parameter . Figure 2 reports the prices of the star firm and a periphery firm,
obtained by means of a simulation where  = 06,  = 1, while  varies between 0 and 02, the step
of the grid being 001.
[   2 ]
As shown by Figure 2, the star firm charges a higher price than the periphery firms if and only
if  does not exceed a threshold value, which is approximately 015. When  is above 015, the
competition eﬀect deprives the star firm of so much monopoly power that it starts charging a lower
price compared to the periphery firms. We also performed simulations for star-shaped networks
with a number of nodes diﬀerent from 6. The results are qualitatively the same as in Figure 2.
We then perform the same exercise for the line or chain network (Hotelling competition as in
Figure 1b) with  = 5. This network starts at node  = 1 and finishes at node  = 5, where node
3 is the midpoint, nodes 1 and 5 are the endpoints and nodes 2 and 4 are the between nodes. The
results are displayed in Figure 3. We find results similar to that of Figure 2. Indeed, we see that
there is a threshold value of  (roughly  = 02) for which prices of the endpoint nodes become
higher than that of the midpoint nodes. This again highlights the trade oﬀ between better access
to market and facing tougher competition mentioned above.
[   3 ]
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4.2

A change in the spatial discount factor 

We now turn to studying how the equilibrium p∗ varies with . Just like in the preceding subsection, we are able to state clear-cut analytical results for low values of , while otherwise we
proceed with simulations.14
4.2.1

Analytical results when  is not too large

Diﬀerentiating (26) with respect to  yields
2

X 
∗ X ∗
+
=







(39)

∈N

6=

where


X

 ()
=

−1


=0

The following diagonal dominance condition holds for suﬃciently low values of :


X




| |



(40)

6=

Observe that (40) has the same nature as (24), but uses   instead of  as weights.
Using (39) and (40), it can be shown that the following result holds.
Proposition 4 For suﬃciently low values of , we have p∗   0, i.e. an increase in spatial
discount factor  leads to higher prices.
The intuition behind this result is as follows: when  increases, firm  will have less monopoly
power over consumer , but better access to all the other consumers. The latter eﬀect clearly
dominates the former when  is not too large. This result may seem puzzling, for a higher spatial
discount factor may be viewed as a reduction in transportation costs. Ever since Hotelling (1929),
models of spatial competition typically predict that this type of shocks leads to tougher competition,
which entails a reduction in prices. This discrepancy of our results and the conventional wisdom
is definitely worth discussing. However, we choose to postpone this discussion until Section 4.2.3,
where we explicitly reformulate our model in terms of transportation costs, a reformulation that
does not change our main results. We only observe here that Proposition 4 echoes the result
obtained by Chen and Riordan (2008), who show that competition may be both price-decreasing
and price-increasing.
14

In Section 4.2.3 below, we reformulate our model in terms of transportation cost  instead of spatial discount
factor  and show that the comparative statics of equilibrium prices with respect to  are qualitatively the same.
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4.2.2

Numerical simulations

Let us now understand how  aﬀects equilibrium prices when products are only slightly diﬀerentiated, i.e. when  is fairly large. Because obtaining analytical comparative statics results is more
involved in this case, we will resort to numerical simulations.
As above, we will consider a star-shaped network (Chen-Riordan competition) with  = 6. We
look at how the equilibrium prices charged by firms located, respectively, at the “star” node and at
the “periphery” nodes vary with the spatial discount factor . Figure 4 displays the results when
 = 015 (which means relatively low substitutability across neighboring varieties, i.e. softer local
competition). Figure 5 gives the results when  = 03 (which means relatively high substitutability
across neighboring varieties, hence tough local competition). We can see that the results are
qualitatively diﬀerent between these two cases.
When  = 015, we find that the “star” firm enjoys higher monopoly power (that is, charges
higher price) than the “peripheral” firms if  lies in an intermediate domain (from 01 to 0625).
Otherwise, peripheral firms price at a higher level. This may be explained by a considerable
advantage the “star” firm gains from being a “star” in having better access to the markets. This
advantage fades when  is close to 0 (which means little access to markets other than the local
market of a firm) or to 1 (all firms have almost complete access to all markets). Indeed, on the
one hand, being a “star” does not yield better market access than the others have. On the other
hand, the “star” competes directly with everyone (whereas a “peripheral” firm competes directly
with the “star” only), thus bearing a burden of high competitive pressure. As a result, when  is
close to either 0 or 1, the price of the “star” is lower.
[   4 ]
When  = 03, being a “star” is even less of an advantage. Indeed, we see that the firm located
at the center always charges a lower price than the “peripheral” firms. On top of it, we have here
an example of non-monotone behavior of equilibrium prices with respect to , which confirms our
results above, which hold when  is “not too large”.
[   5 ]
Finally, as above, we perform the same exercise for the line or chain network (Hotelling competition as in Figure 1b) with  = 5 and for  = 015. This network starts at node  = 1 and finishes
at node  = 5, where node 3 is the midpoint, nodes 1 and 5 are the endpoints and nodes 2 and 4
are the between nodes. The results are displayed in Figure 6. We find results similar to that of
Figure 4, even though the picture is more complex. There is a non-monotonic relationship when 
increases and the mid-point firm tends to charge the highest prices when  has intermediate values.
When comparing the between nodes and the endpoint nodes, we see again that the former charge
a higher prices only when  takes intermediate values. This again highlights the trade oﬀ between
better access to market and facing tougher competition mentioned above.
[   6 ]
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4.2.3

Transportation cost versus spatial discount factor

An alternative formulation of the model suggests that consumers’ preference for closer varieties is
embodied not in the existence of spatial discount factors, but in the presence of positive transportation cost per unit of distance and per unit of consumption, which consumers bear to get access to
each variety. Formally, instead of (1), consumer ’s utility is now equal to
⎛
⎞
X
X
X
1
 − ⎝
2 + 
   ⎠ 
 ( G) = 0 + 
(41)
2
∈N

∈N

∈N

while the budget constraint is given by

0 +

X

( +  ) =  

∈N

where  is transportation cost per unit of distance,  is the income of individual , and  is the
geodesic distance between nodes  and . This formulation assumes that, whenever individual 
consumes one unit of variety , she has to pay a shopping (transportation) cost   0 per unit of
distance (here distance is discrete, so each unit is the distance between two adjacent nodes).15
In this formulation, the network captures the geographical space so that the distance between
nodes in the network corresponds to the geographical distance between firms or consumers. As
a result, diﬀerent network structures (star, circle, etc.) correspond to diﬀerent configurations of
transportation networks, urban structures, etc. The way we defined above varieties or diﬀerentiated
products is now diﬀerent. Here, goods are only diﬀerentiated by their geographical locations. As a
result, what we called the “ideal” variety of consumer  above indicates here the good supplied at
location . Thus, consumer  (i.e. the one who resides at  in the network) will suﬀer a disutility of
consuming good  located two hops away from  due to the presence of transportation cost. However,
in locations  and , the consumer will consume the same good. The firms’ space has a similar
interpretation. Therefore, the proximity network eﬀect is here due to geographical proximities so
that, for example, in a star network, consumers do not lose too much from consuming goods at
diﬀerent locations because they are all geographically close to each other. If we now consider the
love-for-variety eﬀect, then in the star network there is relatively low competition between firms
because the peripheral firms are located far away from each other and all compete with the firm in
the center of the network.
The inverse demand of consumer  for variety  is then given by:
 =  −  −  − 

X

    = 1     

(42)

6=

or, in vector-matrix form,
p = 1 − d − (I + G)x 
15

As in all the address models,  could also be interpreted as the cost of consuming a good diﬀerent from the ideal
variety.
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where
⎛

⎞
1
⎜ ⎟
1 ≡ ⎝ ... ⎠ 
1

⎛

⎞
1
⎜
⎟
d ≡ ⎝ ... ⎠ 


We can see that the inverse demand given by (42) is the same as the one given by (5) when
 =  =  −  .
In this new framework, consumer ’s individual demands for all varieties are given by:
x∗ = (I + G)−1 (1 − d − p) = B (− G) (1 − d − p) 
This leads to the following aggregate demands faced by firms:
X∗ = B (− G) (1 − D(G)1 −  p) 

(43)

where D(G) ≡ ( )∈N is the distance matrix of (N  G)
P
Let  stand for the farness of node ,  ≡ ∈N  . Since the closeness centrality  of node
 is usually defined by  ≡ 1 (Jackson, 2008), the vector f ≡ D(G)1 in (43) can be viewed as
the vector of inverse closeness centralities. As a result, the aggregate demand faced by firm  can
be written as:
⎡
⎤
¶
X
X µ

  −  −   −
  ⎦
(44)
∗ =  ⎣

∈N

6=

In order to diﬀerentiate the impact of willingness-to-pay  from that of transportation cost 
on the demand faced by firm , we rewrite (44) as follows:
⎞
⎛
X

(45)
∗ =  ⎝ −  −   −
  ⎠

6=

P
where  ≡
∈N  is the sign-alternating Bonacich centrality of node  under u = 1, while
P

 ≡ ∈N   is the weighted sign-alternating Bonacich centrality of node , where the weights
are defined by the farnesses, or, equivalently, the inverse closeness centralities , i.e. u = f . The
interaction between these two centrality measures shapes the impact of transportation cost  on
the aggregate demand faced by firm . Observe that, in (45), the impact of the willingness-to-pay
 on firm ’s demand is fully captured by  (− G 1). We can determine the profit of firm  as
follows:
⎡
⎤
X

  ⎦
(46)
  ≡  ∗ =   ⎣ −  −   −

6=

Firm ’s first-order condition leads to:
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2  +

X
6=

  =  −

 
 
 

(47)

Solving (47) in  yields
 = A −

X

Γ  

(48)

6=

where

A ≡

1
2

h
i
[]
P

−
(
(−)

)

∈N
=0


P∞
 []
=0 (−) 

P∞

(49)

while Γ are defined by (30). Equation (48) may be viewed as a (more) testable counterpart of
(27), for, unlike the spatial discount factor , which is a parameter of preferences, transportation
costs  are potentially observable.
Comparing (47) to (27), we see that the models (spatial discount factor and transportation cost)
are very similar. Let us now investigate the comparative statics properties of prices with respect
to transportation cost  and see if they are similar to that of prices and . By diﬀerentiating (47),
we obtain:
2


∗ X ∗
+
=− 





(50)

6=

Hence, the comparative statics of the equilibrium prices p∗ with respect to transportation cost 
is fully captured by  . Along the lines of Section 4.2.1, we can show that, using (50), the following
result holds:
Proposition 5 When products are enough diﬀerentiated, we have p∗   0, i.e. an increase in
transportation cost  leads to lower prices.
In other words, with the transportation cost model, where  =  −  , we obtain the same
comparative-static result (Proposition 5) as in the spatial discount factor model (Proposition 4),
where  =  . Indeed, when  increases or  decreases, each firm  exerts less monopoly power
over consumer  but has better access to the market. When products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated
(i.e. when  is not too large), the latter eﬀect dominates the former, and thus the impact of an
increase of  or a decrease of  on prices is positive.
Interestingly, these results are exactly the opposite to those obtained in the standard spatial
competition models a la Hotelling where an increase in transportation cost  usually increases the
local-monopoly power of firms, which, in turn, increase their prices. To understand why we have
a diﬀerent result, let us revisit the price game in the standard Hotelling’s spatial duopoly model.
For simplicity, assume that firms 1 and 2 are located at the endpoints of the product space [0 1]
so that 1 = 0 and 2 = 1. The demand faced by, say, firm 1 is then given by
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2 − 1

(51)
2
where, as above,   0 is the transportation cost per unit of distance. To understand the diﬀerence
between our model and that of Hotelling, let us write the aggregate demand of firm 1 in our model
when the network is a dyad, i.e. it is only composed of two firms. For that, let us rewrite equation
(44) for  = 2 and for firm 1. We obtain:
¶
µ
¸
∙

∗
− 11 1 − 12 2 
(52)
1 = 2 11 + 22  −
2
1 =

We see that (51) and (52) are similar in many respects; in particular, they are both linear in
prices. However, these two demand equations have one fundamental diﬀerence. On the one hand,
by diﬀerentiating (51), we have:
−

1
1
1
=
= 
1
2
2

i.e. the own price eﬀect and the cross price eﬀect balance each other. Put diﬀerently, in the standard
Hotelling model, if both firms increase their prices by the same amount, the demand faced by firm
1 will not change. This indicates a strong substitution eﬀect. On the other hand, if we diﬀerentiate
(52), we obtain:
1∗
= −211 
1

1∗
= −212 
2

(53)

The comparative statics result in the Hotelling model is not anymore true here. Furthermore, using
(23), when the value of  is not too high, we have:
−

1∗
1∗
À

1
2

This is the main reason why, in Propositions 4 and 5, we obtain the opposite result compared to
that of the Hotelling model. Indeed, the demand (51) may be viewed as a limiting case of the
linear demand (52) with a very high substitution term,  → 1, while we prove our result for the
opposite case when products are diﬀerentiated enough. This argument sheds light on the results
of our numerical simulations shown in Figure 6. When  is suﬃciently high, with a product space
(network) as in the Hotelling model, we obtain the opposing result of Proposition 4. In that case,
we are back to the standard intuition of the spatial competition models a la Hotelling.

5

Symmetric equilibrium with regular networks

In the above section, we have studied how the market outcome varies with the degree of substitutability , the distance decay factor , and the transportation cost . Another question of interest
is how the equilibrium responds to changes in the structure of the network. For example, what
happens when competition gets less localized, i.e. when new links emerge without breaking the
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old ones? It is diﬃcult to answer this question in the general case. To obtain clear-cut results, we
now consider a special case when the equilibrium in the price-setting game is symmetric, i.e. when
∗ = ∗ for all  ∈ N .
As implied by (27), the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium to be symmetric
is given by:
 ( G) w

X

  

(54)

∈N

where w denotes proportionality. The right-hand side of (54) is independent of , while the lefthand side is, by (20), a polynomial of  but is also independent of . Hence, (54) holds for any
admissible values of  and  if and only if both  ( G) and  are the same for all  ∈ N .
Furthermore,  ( G) =  ( G) is equivalent to the following condition:
for any  ≤  and for any   ∈ N   () =  ()

(55)

Condition (55) tells us that, for a symmetric equilibrium to exist, the network (N  G) has to be
“symmetric” in some sense. The weakest concept of symmetry for networks is regularity. Recall
that a network is regular if all nodes have the same degree    , which is known as the valency
of a regular graph. However, regularity of (N  G) is a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition for
(55) to hold. A counterexample is given by the Frucht graph (Biggs, 1974, Chap. 15). The Frucht
graph is a regular graph with  = 3,  = 12, a total of 18 edges, but it is not symmetric. Figure 7
displays the Frucht graph.
[   7 ]
If (N  G) is the Frucht graph, direct computation under  = 015 and  = 075 yields the
following equilibrium price vector:
p∗ =

³

0230 0232 0225 0239 0240 0235 0230 0231 0245 0234 0235 0235

´T

A suﬃcient condition for (55) is that the network is vertex transitive. Vertex transitivity means
that, for any   ∈ N , there exists an automorphism of (N  G) that maps  into . Moreover,
vertex transitivity implies that  =  for all  ∈ N also holds. More intuitively, the network is
vertex transitive if all nodes have the same centrality measure (this has to be true for any centrality
measure).16 Clearly, both the complete (Chamberlain-type) network and the circular (Salop-type)
network are vertex transitive.
Observe that a network is regular if and only if −1 G is a bistochastic matrix. In this case, we
have  = max (G). Thus, (8) boils down to   1. The unique interior symmetric equilibrium
price ∗ is then given by:
∗ =

 1 +  + 2 2 +    +  


1 + (1 + )

16

(56)

For example, the Frucht graph is regular but nodes do not have the same eigenvector centrality, which entails
asymmetric distance distribution.
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[3]

where  ≡  = 1 +  2  −  3  + .
Using equation (56), we can study how prices change when competition becomes less localized,
which we model by adding new links to the network without removing the existing ones, and
keeping the set of nodes unchanged. To be precise, assume that the network changes from (N  G)
to (N  G0 ), where () both G and G0 are regular, and () G0 is obtained from G by adding new
links, without removing the old ones. In particular, this means that the valency 0 of G0 exceeds
, which is the valency of G. We have the following result:
Lemma 6 Assume that  is not too large while  ∈ (0 1). Then, both the numerator and the
denominator of (56) increase when G changes to G0 .
The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. When competition gets less localized, two eﬀects
are at work. First, the numerator of (56) captures the market access eﬀect, which results in skewing
the distribution of distances (how many nodes are at distance 1 from , at distance 2 from , etc.)
toward zero, thus bringing all consumers closer to each firm. Second, the numerator of (56) captures
the competition eﬀect since competition gets tougher as new links arise. The lemma basically states
that the two eﬀects work in the opposite directions: the market access eﬀect always drives prices
upwards, while competition eﬀect leads to a reduction in prices. Which of the two eﬀects dominates
is a priori ambiguous. Indeed, the total change in prices is given by


∆ =

∗

"

#
1 +  + 2 2 +    +   + MA() 1 +  + 2 2 +    +  
−

1 + (1 + ) + Comp()
1 + (1 + )

where
MA() ≡ ∆ + 2 ∆2 +    +  ∆
and
¡ ¢
Comp() ≡ ( + )2 ∆ + O  3 

The intuition behind the terms MA() and Comp() is easy to grasp. The term MA() captures
the market access eﬀect, which is the higher the more skewed the distance distribution gets to the
left when new substitutability links emerge. In other words, MA() is a measure of a change in
firms’ closeness to the whole population of consumers. It is worth noting that MA() varies with the
spatial discount factor , but not with the substitutability . On the contrary, the term Comp()
depends on , but not on . This term captures the competition eﬀect stemming from better
substitution across varieties due to a denser network. To sum up, introducing MA() and Comp()
provides a clear comparison of the roles played by the parameters  and  in our model: the former
governs the market-access eﬀect, while the latter shows the intensity of competition eﬀect.
Clearly, ∆∗  0 if and only if
MA()

 ∗ 
Comp()
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i.e. when the market size eﬀect dominates over the competition eﬀect. Whether this condition
holds is a priori unclear. The following proposition gives an answer.
Proposition 7 Assume that () the product variety network is regular, and ()  is not too high.
When competition becomes less localized (denser networks), there exist two threshold values,   ∈
(0 1), of the distance decay factor , such that the competition eﬀect dominates the market access
eﬀect if and only if     . Otherwise, the market access eﬀect dominates the competition
eﬀect.
This result concurs with that of Arie et al. (2015) who study the impact of multimarket contacts
between firms on the toughness of competition. Although these authors work with a very diﬀerent
setting from ours, they find a non-monotonic relationship between firms’ prices and markets shares.
We diﬀer from them by capturing a varying degree of overlap between markets served by diﬀerent
firms (closer firms compete more fiercely) while, in Arie et al. (2015), each market is either private
or fully overlapping.

6

Further implications of our model

In this section, we further analyze some interesting properties of our model and put forward the
importance of network structure on equilibrium outcomes.

6.1

Herfindahl index

Antitrust authorities often use the Herfindahl index to measure market concentration. The index is
P
defined as =1 2 where  is firm ’s market share. We follow Tirole (1988) and use firm’s output
to calculate market shares, so that the (equilibrium) market share of firm  in network G is given
by:
∗ (G)
∗ (G) = ∗
 (G)
where ∗ (G) is the equilibrium quantity of variety  produced by firm  operating in network
G and ∗ (G) is the total equilibrium quantity of all varieties produced in network G. Clearly,
P ∗
=1  (G) = 1. From equation (5), we can calculate the equilibrium quantity of variety  produced
by firm  as follows:

X
∗
∗
∗
 (G) ≡  =
while

∗ (G)

=

P

∗
=1  .

=1

We have seen that
⎛

∗ =  ⎝

X

∈N

  −  ∗ −

X
6=

 ∗ ⎠

where the equilibrium prices ∗ and ∗ are determined in (32).
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⎞

When a symmetric equilibrium exists (i.e. when a network is regular and vertex-transitive, see
Section 5 above), all firms produce the same quantity. Hence, the Herfindahl index always attains
its minimum value, which is 1 . For this reason, Chamberlinian product space (Fig. 1a) and
Salop-type product space (Figure 1c) with the same number  of varieties/nodes always feature the
same value 1 of the Herfindahl index, which does not depend on toughness of local competition
, nor on the spatial discount factor .
In order to better understand how industrial concentration varies with the network structure,
we consider two simple irregular networks with  = 4 varieties and 4 consumers: the Hotelling
network (Fig. 1b) and the Chen-Riordan network (Fig. 1d). Figure 8 shows how the Herfindahl
index varies with  in both these cases. We take  ∈ [0 025], and  = 05.
[   8 ]
Interestingly, there is no clear prediction on which market is more concentrated. It depends
on the parameters  (spatial discount factor) and  (which is the inverse measure of product
diﬀerentiation) and on the network structure. As can be seen from Figure 8, if we compare Hotelling
competition (chain network) with Chen-Riordan competition (star network) under  = 05 , then,
for  between 0044 and 0192, the market is more concentrated in Hotelling competition than in
the Chen-Riordan competition, while otherwise the opposite result holds true. This result is related
to what we found in Section 4 where we show that, in a star-shaped network, the firm located in
the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the peripheral firms.

6.2

Network versus non-network eﬀects

What do we gain by having a network approach to modeling markets of diﬀerentiated goods? To
shed light on this question, we illustrate here the diﬀerence between “network”and “non-network”
eﬀects. Assume  = 1. Then, in the complete network (Chamberlinian competition), we have pure
monopolistic competition since
 (1 − )
(57)
∗ =
2 (1 − ) + ( − 1)
This is exactly the result for the benchmark monopolistic competition model without network (see
Combes et al., 2008, Chap. 3). If we diﬀerentiate (57), we obtain:
∗
∗
∗
0,
 0 and
T 0 ⇔  Q 1



In Section 4, we have seen that, with a more general approach in terms of networks, the comparativestatics results are quite diﬀerent. For example, we have shown the importance of the spatial discount
factor  in evaluating the impact of  on prices. Also, we have seen that these comparative-statics
results crucially depend on the network structure and that the most “central” firms in a network
do not always enjoy higher monopoly power than other firms and thus do not always charge higher
prices. We have seen, for example, that for a star-shaped network, the firm located in the star node
(the most “central”firm) does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This
is because the firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery
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firms, but it also faces tougher competition (all peripheral firms instead of one).

6.3

Testable predictions of the model

Our model yields three main predictions. First, it shows that firm’s network centrality aﬀects
prices but without giving a clear sign of this relationship.17 We have seen in Section 4 that more
central firms can either charge higher or lower prices. Interestingly, Firgo et al. (2015) have tested
this kind of relationship. Using data from the retail gasoline market of Vienna, Austria, they
show that the relationship between centrality and pricing in a spatially diﬀerentiated market is not
significant.18 They explain their results by the existence of two countervailing eﬀects: centrality
implies a larger number of consumers (higher prices) but, at the same time, is associated with a
larger number of direct competitors (lower prices). This is exactly what our model also predicts,
suggesting a more sophisticated test of this relationship. For example, Firgo et al. (2015) only
use the degree centrality while our model suggests to use the sign-alternating Bonacich centrality
measure of varieties (defined in Section 3.1), which is diﬀerent to the standard Bonacich centrality
measure (Ballester et al., 2006) since the sign of the weights changes with the length of the path
in the network.
Second, our model demonstrates that prices across firms are not necessary strategic complements. Indeed, the network literature has derived the following prediction:
 =  + 

X

 

(58)

6=

where  captures the network and  usually corresponds to the characteristics of the market/agents (see e.g. Ballester et al. 2006; Chen et al., 2015; Cohen-Cole et al. 2014, 2015).
Researchers have been testing this relationship and showed that  is usually positive, which indicates complementarity between prices. This implies that if a competitor  increases her price,
the best-response of  is to increase her price, the marginal increase being equal to . This is, for
example, what has been found empirically by Cohen-Cole et al. (2014) for prices (interest rates)
or by König et al. (2014) for quantities. However, our model predicts a diﬀerent outcome. Indeed,
the key equation is given by (28), that is:19
 =  −

X

Γ  

(59)

6=

where  and Γ are defined by (29) and (30). In particular, we showed our price game never
17
In the standard network games literature (Jackson and Zenou, 2015), agent’s centrality always has a positive
impact on prices.
18
Their network is defined by geographical distances since gasoline stations are connected through a network of
roads and intersections and can be characterized by diﬀerent degrees of centrality (interconnectedness) within this
network.
19
In the case of transportation costs (Section 4.2.3), we obtain a similar relationship

 = A −
Γ  
6=

but A is defined by (49) and not by (29) while Γ are still defined by (30).
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exhibits strategic complements (or strategic substitutes) since

1 
=−
T0

2 

(60)

Our model is clearly diﬀerent from (58) as it generates a richer pattern of relationships between
prices. Moreover, the terms  and Γ depend on the network structure in a non-trivial way. We
have seen that   0, but  T 0 for  6= . In particular, if  = 1, i.e. goods  and  are
close substitutes, then   0, which renders prices  and  strategic complements. If  = 0
[2]
and  = 1, i.e. goods  and  are less close substitutes ( = 2), then   0 and therefore
prices  and  are strategic substitutes. Indeed, when  = 1, then if firm  decreases its price,
firm  has to decrease its price because of tougher competition due to the fact that  and  are
[2]
close substitutes. Now, assume that  = 0 and  = 1, and that  is linked to  and . When
 reduces its price and  does not react, this positive demand shock on  translates to a positive
demand shock on  because consumers who love varieties need to consume more of good  since the
demand for good  is reduced. From an empirical viewpoint, equation (60) provides an explicit
expression of the elasticity of prices and a measure of whether prices are strategic complements or
substitutes, which depends on the sign-alternating Bonacich centrality measures of varieties defined
P
 []
as  = ∞
=0 (−)  . If one has network data,  is easy to calculate after estimating equation
(59), which gives a value of .
Interestingly, using a very diﬀerent model, Amiti et al. (2016) find an elasticity of 035, which
means that when a firm’s competitors raise their prices by 10%, the firm increases its own price
by 3.5% in the absence of any movement in its marginal cost, and thus entirely translating into an
increase in its markup. In our model, the elasticity is calculated in a diﬀerent way and it would be
interesting to see how much it diﬀers in the data when network eﬀects are included (when network
data are available). It would also be important to see whether prices are strategic complements or
substitutes by estimating  .
Third, our model yields some clear-cut comparative statics results that could be tested empirically. In our view, the most interesting one is the one concerning the transportation cost (Section
4.2.3). We have shown that when products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, an increase in transportation cost leads to lower prices (Proposition 5). As stated above, this result is the opposite to the
one obtained in spatial competition models a la Hotelling. For example, one could use the data of
Firgo et al. (2015) to test whether this relationship is positive or negative.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a new model of price competition, which combines features of both spatial
and monopolistic competition, thus encompassing two very diﬀerent aspects of product diﬀerentiation: love for variety and consumers’ location-specific taste heterogeneity. As a consequence, our
model allows for a rich set of regimes of imperfect competition. The salient feature of our setting is
that we model the product space as a network, where link between two varieties exists if and only if
they are direct substitutes, while consumer’s willingness to pay decays with the geodesic distance of
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a specific variety from her ideal variety. Thus, consumers exhibit love for variety, as in monopolistic
competition, but are willing to pay less for more distant varieties, like in the address approach.
Chamberlin-type or Hotelling-type spatial structures are obtained as a limiting case when the substitutability network is a complete graph or a chain. We show that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium in prices where each equilibrium price is a function of the weighted Bonacich centrality
of the firm. We also investigate how the degree of product diﬀerentiation and the spatial discount
factor aﬀect the equilibrium prices. We find that, when products are highly diﬀerentiated, a small
reduction in the degree of diﬀerentiation makes competition tougher and reduces all prices. However, the magnitude of price reduction depends on both the network structure and the distance
decay factor. If, for example, we consider a star-shaped network, we find that the firm located at
the star node does not always enjoy higher monopoly power than the other firms. This is because
the firm located at the star node has better access to the market than the periphery firms, but
it also faces tougher competition (all peripheral firms instead of one). We also study symmetric
equilibria and show how denser networks aﬀect prices. Finally, we analyze some other implications
of our model by calculating the Herfindahl index (which measures market competitiveness) and
determining the role of networks in monopolistic competition.
We believe that this paper provides a methodological contribution by modeling firms’ and
consumers’ heterogeneity by their position in the network of product varieties. We also believe
that our model could be used to analyze issues related to economic geography, international trade,
economic growth, etc. We finally hope that our contribution will spur further research in these
directions.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1: Let us give a condition that ensures that the utility function (3) is
strictly concave. This is equivalent to have that I + G is a positive definite matrix. A necessary
and suﬃcient condition for this to be true is that all eigenvalues of I+G are strictly positive. Since
G is symmetric, then all its eigenvalues are real and we can thus rank them. Since the eigenvalues
of I + G are equal to: 1 + 1 (G)     1 +  (G), the utility function is strictly concave if and
only if (4) holds.20
Proof of Proposition 2. Restate (27) as follows:
⎛
⎞
X  
1
e∗ = ⎝1 +
(1 − ̃ )⎠ 
2
 

 ∈ N

∈N 6=

(61)

e ∗ the linear mapping described by (61).
where e ≡  ̄ . Denote by p
e ∗ is a contraction mapping. Indeed, by (24) we have
Condition (24) implies that p
X ¯¯   ¯¯
¯
¯
¯   ¯  1 for all  ∈ N 
∈N 6=

which is the exact criterion for a linear mapping to be a contraction with respect to the 1 -norm
in R .
We now show that there exists a convex compact set ∆ ⊂ R
+ , such that (i) ∆ is separated from
∗
∗
e maps ∆ into itself.
e (∆) ⊆ ∆, i.e. p
the origin, and (ii) p

Consider ∆ ≡ {e
p ∈ R+ | ≤ e ≤ 1 − }, where   0 is small enough. What we mean by
“small enough” is clarified below. As implied by (61), the necessary and suﬃcient condition for
e ∗ (∆) ⊆ ∆ is given by
p
−   ≤

X
1
  (1 − e ) ≤   
1 − 2

(62)

∈N 6=

for all e ∈ [ 1 − ]. In other words, (62) says that [−     ] must contain the range in
X
1
  (1 − e ) actually varies over ∆. Thus, (62) can be equivalently restated
which
1 − 2
∈N 6=

as follows:

−   ≤

X
1
min
  (1 − e ) and
1 − 2 p∈∆
∈N 6=

Clearly, we have

min
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Observe that  (G)  0 since the (G) =
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 (G) = 0
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(63)

∈N 6=
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Plugging (64)−(65) into (63) and slightly rearranging, we ultimately find that (62) holds if and
only if
⎫
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⎬
⎨
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X
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⎭
⎩
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⎨
⎩
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e ∗ (∆) ⊆ ∆.
then the diagonal dominance condition (24) implies (66), whence (62). Thus, p
e ∗ is a contraction mapping that maps ∆ into itself, while ∆ is separated from the
To sum up, p
e ∗ has a unique fixed point. In other words,
origin. Hence, by the contraction mapping theorem, p
there exists a unique interior equilibrium price vector p∗ , such that ∗  . Since the best reply
functions (27) are linear, a closed-form solution for the equilibrium prices p∗ given by (32) is easily
derived. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 6: We set ∆ ≡ 0 − for all  ∈ N . The change of the denominator may
¡ ¢
be expressed as ( + )2 ∆+O  3 , which is positive when  is not too large, since the emergence
of new links leads to ∆  0. Thus, it remains to prove that the change in the numerator is also
positive. The latter is given by
∆ + 2 ∆2 +    +  ∆
where  is the diameter of the network (N  G).21 Observe that, since the set of nodes N remains
unchanged, we have  + 2 +  +  = 0 + 20 +  + 0 =  . This can be restated in terms of
changes as follows:
∆ + ∆2 +    + ∆ = 0

(67)

Moreover, the following inequalities hold:
∆  0

∆ + ∆2 ≥ 0



∆ + ∆2 +    + ∆−1 ≥ 0

(68)

Indeed, the magnitude  + 2 +    +  shows the number of nodes which are not further
than  from a fixed node. Because the distance between any two nodes either decreases or remains
unchanged with the emergence of new links, it must be that (68) hold true.
Since (N  G0 ) is obtained from (N  G) by means of adding new links, we always have 0 ≤ . When 0  , we
set by definition 0 ≡ 0 for all   0 .
21
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Furthermore, since  ∈ (0 1), using (68) yields
∆ + 2 ∆2  (∆ + ∆2 ) 2 
∆ + 2 ∆2 + 3 ∆3  (∆ + ∆2 ) 2 + 3 ∆3 ≥ (∆ + ∆2 + ∆3 ) 3 
and so forth. Applying sequentially these inequalities, we end up with
∆ + 2 ∆2 +    +  ∆  (∆ + ∆2 +    + ∆ )  
Combining this with (67), we have ∆ + 2 ∆2 +    +  ∆  0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 7: As stated by in Lemma 6,  ()  0 whenever  ∈ (0 1). What
happens when either  = 0 or  = 1? Obviously,  (0) = 0. More interestingly, we also have
 (1) = 0, which is implied by (67). This means that  () is a non-monotone function of
 over [0 1]. Hence, d( )d = 0 has at least one internal solution. Denote by 0 and 1 the
smallest and the largest of such solutions, respectively.22 Since  () ≥ 0, and  () = 0 if
and only if  ∈ {0 1}, it must be that  () increases over [0 0 ] and decreases over [1  1].
¡ ¢
Because the competition eﬀect () = ( + )2 ∆ + O  3 is strictly positive, we have
 ()  ()∗  when  is either close to zero or close to one. However, if  is not too
large for ()∗   min  () to hold, then the equation ()∗  =  () has
∈[0 1 ]

a unique internal solution  over [0 0 ], and a unique internal solution  over [1  1]. Moreover,
¡
¢
()∗   () for all  ∈   , and ()∗    () otherwise.

22

Because () is a polynomial of , dd = 0 has a finite number of internal solutions. Hence 0 and
1 are always well-defined.
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Figure 1. Some commonly used types of competition

1.a. Chamberlinian type of competition:

G

is a

1.b. Hotelling type of competition:

complete graph

G

1.c. Salop type of competition:

G

is a

is a

chain

1.d. Chen-Riordan type of competition:

cycle

G

1

is a

star

İ
İ

ş
ş

Ś

